industry: that is, a mega-exchange with dominant electronic trading platforms. As humans are substantially being replaced by machines, and transactions are occurring at the speed at light, exchanges need to continuously reinvent themselves to keep up. 12 Furthermore, the ICE-NYX merger is a necessary move not only for the two companies involved but also for the American markets as a whole, in which exchanges are losing their dominance. 13 
II. ICE's Development
ICE is the brainchild of Jeffrey Sprecher and is backed by some of the largest investment bankers and energy traders. 14 Hence, ICE's impressive growth and success should probably not be that surprising. Sprecher purchased Continental Power Exchange ("CPE"), ICE's predecessor, in1997. 15 CPE, which provided an electronic trading platform, seemed poised for unlimited success until Enron developed its own platform and went on to dominate. 16 Enron's threat to CPE's vitality was, however, Sprecher's blessing in disguise. Enron was the buyer and 12 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 687-88 (2013) ("Computer technology has made finance faster, larger, more global, and more interconnected in form and function. An industry once monopolized by humans has evolved into an industry in which machines play a larger and more influential role. Modern finance is a stage on which the main players are no longer entirely human. Instead, they are cyborgs: part machine, part human. Modern finance is transforming into what this Article calls "cyborg finance," or "cy-fi." This sea change is ongoing, incomplete, and without a final judgment on its normative impact and consequences."). See also infra Part III. 13 15 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9, at 52. 16 Buying the NYSE, in One Shot, supra note 6.
seller for each transaction done on its electronic platform, and this model did not go over well with Wall Street banks, which were some of the biggest traders of energy products. 17 Hence, when Sprecher began seeking investors for CPE, banks like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, were happy to invest in Enron's competitor. 18 To facilitate the deal, Sprecher gave up a large percent of his ownership interest to the banks, which in turn gave their own stakes to several of the largest power companies. 19 Undoubtedly, the ICE-NYX merger is motivated by the prospects of increasing financial wealth and acquiring more prominence in global markets. 41 And, even though the ICE Group will be a market leader, it will be playing catch up, at least in some areas, to market giants, such as the CME Group Inc. 42 But ICE's acquisition of NYX is more than simple economics:
arguably, it is a necessary move for the companies to be able to maximize their growth potential in the evolving market landscape, remain competitive, and meet customers' needs. ("While both exchange companies offer U.S. futures linked to stock indexes, their markets combined are far smaller in terms of trading activity than similar equity-focused markets run by competitor CME Group Inc. (CME)."). 43 See (ICE) Merger With NYSE, supra note 31 (Speaking at an event held by the Futures Industry Association, Sprecher is quoted as follows: "ICE has acquired asset classes in different jurisdictions, but not just for growth ….
[A]part from regulation, the customs change in different locales, so it helps to have assets in Europe and US. Our customers are big and global and they are trying to figure out how to manage risk globally. We have had to move things around like chess pieces in order to keep up with clients' needs. M&A isn't so much trying to be big but to have enough pieces to solve customer problems."); Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32.
See also 2012 Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 9 (statement of CEO, Sprecher: "believe that the combination of ICE with NYSE Euronext will result in an expanded portfolio of products and services available to our customers and provide new growth and diversification opportunities for investors.").
For example, by merging their multi-asset class companies, the ICE-NYX merger promises not only for growth and competiveness in the marketplace, internationally, but also for: capital efficiency, by cutting costs via the combination of trading platforms for example; maximization of revenues; diversification of revenue sources; and unlocking of value through merger related cost synergy. 44 This is in no way saying that this mega-merger, or others of its kind, poses no potential detriment or systemic risks. 45 But the existence of those risks does not change the fact that mega-mergers are strategic answers, from a business perspective, to the current financial landscape.
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In fact, as depicted below, exchange merger and acquisition has been the increasing trend over the last decade. As other industries, such as banking, become more centralized and cross-border, there is more pressure on exchanges to follow suit for cost effectiveness and efficiency. 54 The benefit of merging two companies with extensive operations, such as ICE and NYX, is that operating costs will likely be significantly reduced. 55 In the case of cross-border merger, for example, exchanges, by combining different geographic markets, can exploit economies of scale in trading. 56 networks for finance, which made today's Wall Street possible…By the mid-1990s, computers took over significant functions at major financial institutions. By then, computerized networks initiated and managed significant trading in many important financial markets such as stocks, bonds, currency, and commodities. "). 51 Jung, supra note 50, at 729-30. 52 See, e.g., Kokkoris & Caminal, supra note 47, at 456 ("Stock exchanges have merged with derivative exchanges (for example, Euronext and LIFFE) and with settlement operators (for example, Deutsche Börse and Clearstream."). 53 One of the stated objectives of the ICE-NYX merger is exactly this -to provide customers with a more extensive financial service. See Dec. 2012 Press Release, supra note 32 ("'Our transaction is responsive to the evolution of market infrastructure today and offers a range of growth opportunities, while enhancing competition in US and European markets and broadening our ability to address new markets and offer innovative products and services on a global platform," said ICE Chairman and CEO Jeffrey C. Sprecher. "We believe the combined company will be better positioned to compete and serve customers across a broad range of asset classes by uniting our global brands, expertise and infrastructure. With a track record of growth and returns, clearing and M&A integration, we are well positioned to transform our combined companies into a premier global exchange operator that remains a leader in market evolution.'"); see also CME's demutualization -and demutualization of other U.S. exchanges -followed in close proximity to the SEC's 1998 release which stated that: "In this release, the Commission also expresses its view that registered exchanges may structure themselves as for-profit organizations. This will allow alternative trading systems, which are typically proprietary, to choose to register as exchanges without changing their organizational structure. In addition, currently registered exchanges-which are all membership organizations-could choose to demutualize. (2006) ("'Today, domestic and international competition increasingly compels stock exchanges to give up their exclusivity, undergo restructuring, and become publicly traded, for-profit companies, a process referred to as demutualization '") shareholders and raise additional capital. 61 Another take on demutualization as a response mechanism, is that it is a solution for the exchanges to regain or maintain their competitive edge in an increasingly fragmented financial world. 62 The concept of fragmentation will be explored in sub-part B, below.
Outside of being a facilitator or response mechanism, demutualization has been criticized for being problematic: particularly to the extent that it raises conflict of interest issues. 63 Conflict arises because a demutualized exchange has to balance its role as a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and the need to maximize profits for its shareholders. 64 ICE Futures Canada, for example, is "a commodity futures exchange and a self-regulatory organization under the Commodities Futures Act, 1996." 65 The concern has been that the overarching profit motive of demutualized, public exchanges may inhibit exchanges from developing and maintaining high listing standards, especially where these standards are unpopular with shareholders. 66 One response to this concern has often been that "SROs have strong incentives to preserve their reputations as fair and prestigious markets through requirements such as corporate governance listing standards." 67 Acknowledging this concern, the challenge is going to be for regulators to be vigilant in their oversight because demutualization is here to stay. It is an important aspect of exchanges' strategy to remain competitive in the marketplace. It is a necessary response to the effect of globalization and technology on the financial services industry.
B. Implications of the Merger in a Fragmented Market
There is not only a correlation between globalization and demutualization, but also one with fragmentation. Fragmentation is "when investor order flow is directed to different markets that are not connected or are ineffectively connected." 68 A primary impetus behind fragmentation is the technological innovations that have come to dominate trading and markets in general. 69 Globally, there has been a dramatic change in secondary market structure from "primarily manual trading to a market structure with primarily automated trading." Structure, supra note 50, at *3594 ("Trading equities today is no longer as straightforward as sending an order to the floor of a single exchange on which a stock is listed. As discussed in section III below, the current market structure can be described as dispersed and complex: (1) Trading volume is dispersed among many highly automated trading centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks; and (2) trading centers offer a wide range of services that are designed to attract different types of market participants with varying trading needs."); Special Committee on Market Structure Governance and Ownership, supra note 40, at 3 (stating that fragmentation refers to "the trading of orders in several locations without interaction among the orders…."). 69 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 50, at *3594 ("A primary driver and enabler of this transformation of equity trading has been the continual evolution of technologies for generating, routing, and executing orders."). 70 Id. See also O'Hara & Ye, supra note 68, at 1 ("While the traditional exchanges continue to execute orders, they now face a host of competitors ranging from electronic platforms such as ECNS (electronic communication networks) and ATS (alternative trading systems), to the trading desks of broker/dealer firms, and even to a variety of new entrants such as futures and options markets…. And these changes are not just confined to the U.S. markets. European equity trading has seen dramatic growth of electronic platforms such as Chi-X and BATS, and even Canada, where the Toronto Stock Exchange (now known as the TMX group) enjoyed a virtual monopoly on trading, faces the prospect of a fragmented market with the addition of electronic venues such as Alpha, Pure and MATCH Now."). See also Lin, supra note 12, at 690-91 ("While significant volumes of algorithmic trading still occur on public exchanges, a growing volume of trades are taking place in private exchanges and dark pools, away from the purview of the public. 'A dark pool is an anonymous crossing network that allows institutions to hide their orders from the marketplace.'").
Electronic communication networks ("ECNs") and alternative trading systems ("ATS"), for example, have been significant competitors to the traditional exchanges. 71 And these have forced many exchanges to move a lot of their operation on screen to compete -customers may even have come to expect this. 72 For example, after the acquisition of NYBOT was complete, ICE gave customers the choice of traditional trading floors or electronic trading. 73 Most customers soon chose electronic trading. 74 And soon NYBOT's trading floors gave way to electronic trading 75 It may be a hyperbole to call changes in the NASDAQ stock market "extraordinary,"
since that market became highly automated earlier on. 76 But "extraordinary" has been a word used to describe "changes in the nature of trading for NYSE-listed stock." 77 This is probably best explained using a numbers timeline. In a 2000 concept release, the SEC stated that:
The markets for listed equities currently reflect a fairly low degree of fragmentation. Fragmentation has its benefits and its vices. In terms, of benefits, the SEC, in a 2010 concept release, highlighted that fragmentation promotes beneficial competition among markets. 81 "The benefits of such competition include incentives for trading centers to create new products, provide high quality trading services that meet the needs of investors, and keep trading fees low." 82 Furthermore price competition may be enhanced where there are multiple dealers in different market centers competing for order flow on the basis of displayed quotations. 83 In addition, the existence of multiple trading centers has provided more trading options, which has created "greater latency and more sophisticated crossing networks." 84 But without proper balance in market structure, fragmentation may be problematic:
Fragmentation may have a potentially adverse effect on "efficiency, price transparency, best execution of investor orders, and order interaction." 85 In terms of pricing, the existence of multiple market centers "may reduce competition on price, which is one of the most important benefits of greater interaction of buying and selling interest in an individual security." 86 There also is concern that fragmentation harms market quality by "reducing the liquidity available not only in individual markets but in the aggregate market as well." 87 Also, the plethora of disconnected trading venues may not only be fragmenting the market but rather "fracturing [it] into many disparate pieces. 88 How regulators achieve this balance or and to what extent, if any, fragmentation should be curbed, is beyond the scope of this paper. What is of interest is how the ICE-NYX merger factors into this discussion. At least with regards to the US, ICE's CEO, Sprecher, has indicated that fragmentation has gone too far: "The pendulum of electronification of markets went too far in the case of U.S. equities -to the point that people want to know there's a human being watching over their trades…." 89 Sprecher also highlights that while "competition is good[,]fragmentation creates risks which aren't priced in.' The U.S. probably doesn't need 70 execution venues and 200 internalizers." 90 The plan is therefore to maintain the trading floors of the NYSE after (and if) the merger is completed. 91 And by merging two market giants the ICE-NYX transactions seems to be a move toward consolidation. 92 ICE, however, as was discussed in Part II of this paper, has a history of reforming or substantially altering business structure after its acquisitions. Hence, ultimately, only time will tell the true price of this merger on an already fragmented financial service market.
C. The Merger as Impetus or Retardant for SEC-CFTC Consolidation
A lot of contested legal issues are discussed for a short while but then fade away into the world of scholarly forgetfulness. That, however, is not the case when it comes to the issue of whether the SEC and CFTC should be consolidated into one entity. 93 One scholar suggests that this discussion regarding the consolidation of the SEC and CFTC into one regulatory body started as early as 1988. 94 The discourse continues because the dynamism of the markets and the innovation surrounding financial products are unrelentingly pushing at jurisdictional boundaries:
to consolidation, it will not be anytime soon. The lack of a SEC-CFTC merger is not because such a restructuring would not be logical -considering the growing overlap of the products and industries they regulate, it probably is. Rather, this result is more a product of politics: For many, "in a perfect world the two agencies would be combined, but that just isn't Washington." 106 Sure enough, as the financial world continues to converge the case for unified regulation becomes stronger. In addition, the trend of consolidation among exchangesincluding stock and derivative markets -will continue to make justification of the independent agency approach a lot more difficult. 107 Other theories put forward to explain why the two agencies will not give up their jurisdiction includes: (1) the daunting challenge of "combining the often-conflicting cultures of the agencies," and (2) the fight over allocation of jurisdiction that would ensue between competing congressional committees. 108 After the recent crisis, this age-old suggestion of consolidating the two agencies was one of the suggested reform proposals for buttressing the US financial system. 109 It should come as no shock to know that the proposal did not come to fruition. 110 perception was that "the American NYSE would dominate the French exchange." 123 Of course, the merger was successful in the end.
Moving back to the umbrella issue of antitrust, within the last few years there has been a number of instances where competition laws blocked exchange mergers. Joint efforts by Nasdaq and ICE to acquire NYSE were thwarted when the DOJ indicated that it would challenge the transaction. 124 There was concern that, if successful, this transaction would potentially create a monopoly and "would have substantially eliminated competition for corporate stock listing services, opening and closing stock auction services, off-exchange stock reporting services and real-time proprietary equity data products." 125 On the other hand, although there were concerns that a CME-CBOT merger would have been anticompetitive since it would concentrate 85% of the "United States' market for exchange-traded futures in a single exchange," the merger was ultimately successful. 126 In terms of cross-border linkages, one that fell victim to antitrust issues in recent years was the NYX-Deutsche Börse Group (NYX-DB) merger. 127 The concern was that, aggregating futures and options, NYX-DB would have controlled a substantial portion of the European derivatives market -approximately 91%. 128 Although US antitrust authorities approved the deal, the European Commission believed "the deal would create a 'quasi-monopoly' in exchanges' trading of European derivatives." 129 At this stage, the ICE-NYX deal has successfully passed US antitrust requirements. 130 It has also been approved by European regulators who "confirmed that the proposed transaction would not raise competition concerns as NYX and ICE are not direct competitors in the markets concerned and would continue to face competition from a number of other competitors." 131 The
Commission did not identify any competition concerns "as regards the vertical relationship between trading and clearing of derivatives" and furthermore "NYX and ICE are offering contracts belonging to different product markets so their activities do not overlap." 132 
V. Conclusion
The ICE-NYX merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today's marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. 133 
